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welfare and distribution effects of changing water prices in the Metropolitan Region of 
São Paulo. Results show that there is a trade off between average welfare and income 
distribution. A pro-poor price system may result in lower average welfare than a flat 
price system, but in higher individual welfare for the poor. Moreover, there is a trade off 
between revenues for the water company and income distribution. Even though pro-
poor price systems may not be as good for average welfare as flat price systems, their 
direct effects on poverty are important. Introducing pro-poor price systems, however, 
may have financial consequences for the water companies. 
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Abstract
In this paper, distribution and welfare effects of changes in block price systems are eval-
uated. A method is discussed to determine, for a Marshallian demand function, equivalent
variation in case of a block price system. The method is applied to analyze welfare and distri-
bution effects of changing water prices in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo. Results show
that there is a trade off between average welfare and income distribution. A pro-poor price
system may result in lower average welfare than a ﬂat price system, but in higher individual
welfare for the poor. Moreover, there is a trade off between revenues for the water company
and income distribution. Even though pro-poor price systems may not be as good for average
welfare as ﬂat price systems, their direct effects on poverty are important. Introducing pro-poor
price systems, however, may have ﬁnancial consequences for the water companies.
1 Introduction
A basic principle in economics is that in order to get efﬁcient prices, they have to reﬂect marginal
costs. As a consequence, economic theory often recommends the application of ﬂat prices. How-
ever, for some goods, such as residential water and electricity, block pricing systems are regularly
applied. Such pricing systems are said to be better for income distribution as, in case of pro-
gressive block price systems, poor households who consume less, pay lower average prices. A
drawback of block pricing is, however, a potential welfare loss. Even though direct income trans-
fers may lead to larger welfare increases for poor consumers than in-kind subsidies of the same
amount, many (especially public) water suppliers employ block pricing systems as they not only
try to promote efﬁciency but also have other objectives related to equity, cost recovery and local
acceptability (Arbués and Villanúa, 2006). Moreover, particularly in developing countries, alter-
native systems for improving social security, like transfers through income taxes, do not function
properly. Comparisons between the welfareand distribution effectsof alternative pricing systems
are rare in the literature as the methods to derive the welfare effects are not straightforward.
The objective of this paper is to analyze distribution and welfare effects of changes in block
price systems. A method is discussed with which for a linear Marshallian demand function,
equivalent variation of a change in the block price system can be determined. This method ex-
tendsexisting methods usedforderiving equivalentvariationon the basisofMarshalliandemand
curves so that they are applicable for block pricing systems. It is applied to the analysis of water
demand, distribution and welfare effects of alternative water pricing systems in the Metropolitan
Area of São Paulo. Especially the effects of changes in the price system on individual equivalent
1variation and social welfare will be assessed. Note that a partial equilibrium approach is adopted
and that indirect welfare effects of changes in pricing policies are not considered.
Anextensiveliteratureexistsonwelfaremeasurement(seee.g. Slesnick(1998)foranoverview).
The correct measure to use for determining welfare effects of price changes are Hicks’ measures
of Compensating Variation or Equivalent Variation. Most papers dealing with this issue concen-
trate on determining compensating or equivalent variation in case of a linear budget line. Those
considering block price systems especially focus on effects of labor taxation (see e.g. Hausman,
1980). For the case of water, there is an extensive literature on the estimation of residential water
demand functions (see Arbués et al. (2003);Arbués and Villanúa (2006)for an overview). Renzetti
(1992) and García-Valiñas (2005) analyzed welfare effects of reforming water price systems, but
they concentrated on the use of the optimal price theory using Ramsey prices which is not the
focus of the current paper. Rietveld et al. (2000) for the case of Indonesia and Hajispyrou et al.
(2002) for the case of Cyprus are two of the few studies focusing on the welfare effects of block
price systems for residential water use. They, however, analyzed welfare effects of a price system
changing from a block price into a ﬂat price system. The novel element of the current paper is
that especially the more complex case of changes within the block price system are analyzed in
order to be able to assess the effects on both welfare and income distribution.
In this paper, a method is discussed to determine on the basis of the Marshallian demand
function the equivalent variation and social welfare in case of a block price system. In Section 3,
a linear water demand function is estimated for the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo which is
used in Section 4 to analyze the welfare and distribution effects of changes in the price system.
Finally, in Section 5 a number of conclusions are drawn.
2 Marshallian demand and equivalent variation
As stated above, the correct measure to use for determining welfare effects of price changes
are Hicks’ compensating or equivalent variation. Compensating Variation (CV) measures ’the
amount the consumer would pay or would need to be paid to be just as well off after the price
change as she was before the price change’ (Hausman, 1981, pp. 662). Equivalent Variation (EV),
on the other hand, measures the ’amount the consumer would be indifferent about accepting in
lieu of the price change’ (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, pp. 82). CV is based on ex-ante utility and EV
on ex-post utility. In applied economics, however, an often used measure for welfare changes
is consumer surplus. It measures the consumer’s willingness to pay for a price change on the
basis of the Marshallian demand function instead of the Hicksian demand function. Use of the
Marshallian demand function is much easier as it is directly observable in practice, and there-
fore can be estimated easily. A drawback, however, is that it does not compensate for income
effects of price changes, which are taken into account in the Hicksian demand function. Con-
sumer surplus equals compensating variation only under speciﬁc circumstances. Willig (1976)
argued that in most cases the differences between both welfare measures are small and therefore
use of consumer surplus is an appropriate approximation of welfare changes. Others, however,
show that these differences may be substantial. Making a choice between both welfare measures,
however, is not necessary as Hausman (1981) and Vartia (1983) showed that indirect utility and
therefore compensating and equivalent variation can be determined on the basis of the Marshal-
lian demand function. Both methods are based on linear budget constraints. In the case of kinked

























Figure 1: Schematic representation of Equivalent Variation (Panel a) and Compensating Variation
(Panel b).
In this paper, the method developed by Hausman (1981) is extended in order to derive equiv-
alent and compensating variation in a situation with a non-convex budget set. Such a situation
often applies for example in labor markets (see e.g. Hausman, 1985). Similar situations also apply
for electricity and water markets where progressive block price systems are combined with a high
ﬁrst block price (or a ﬁxed fee) to account for ﬁxed cost. In this section, I ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss the
concept of equivalent and compensating variation, which of the two concepts should be used for
ranking alternative policies and how it can be derived on the basis of the Marshallian demand
function. Secondly, this method is extended for a situation with a convex kinked budget curve.
Thirdly, it is discussed how to deal with non-convex budget sets. Finally, using some of the ele-
ments discussed before, a measure for social welfare is discussed that is used to assess the social
welfare effects of block price changes.
Consider a two-good situation in which the second good, which can be interpreted as an
aggregate commodity, is the numeraire whose price is held constant. The price vector is deﬁned
as p = (p,1). The price of the ﬁrst commodity p and income y are normalized with respect to
the price of the second commodity and both commodities are assumed to be separable. At price
p0 = (p0,1) and income level y0, demandis equal to x0 = (x0,x′
0) and utility to u0(x0) (seeFigure
1). Ifthe priceof commodity 1 decreasesto p1, the budget line shifts outwardsandbecomes ﬂatter.
The equivalent income, the income the consumer would need to be as well off without as with the
pricedecrease,is equal to ye. Equivalent variation is deﬁnedas ye−y0. The compensating income,
the income the consumer would need to be as well off with as without the price change, is equal
to yc. Compensating variation is deﬁned as y0 − yc. Both income measures are used as a money
metric indirect utility function. In case of a price increase EV and CV are equal to the welfare loss,
whereas they arethe welfaregain in case of a price reduction. The expenditure function at a given
level of utility u0 and price p = (p,1) is deﬁned as e(p,uo) = minx {p · x|u(x) ≥ u0}1. Using this,
EV and CV of a price change from p0 to p1 are deﬁned as
1For simplicity, in the deﬁnitions of the expenditure function e(p,u0), demand function x(p,y), indirect utility func-
tion V (p,y), equivalent variation EV (·) and compensating variation CV (·), only the price p of the ﬁrst commodity is
mentioned as the price of the second commodity is held constant.
3EV (p0,p1,y0) = e(p0,u1) − e(p1,u1) = e(p0,u1) − y0
CV (p0,p1,y0) = e(p0,u0) − e(p1,u0) = y0 − e(p1,u0)
(1)
The ﬁrst question is which of the two measures to use. Chipman and Moore (1980) and Mas-
Colell et al. (1995) showed that not CV, but only EV can be used for ranking alternative policies
with different price vectors. The reason is that in CV, the money metric indirect utility levels are
based on new prices and initial utility, whereas in EV, they reﬂect the new utility levels that will
be obtained with the new prices.2
The second question is how to derive from the Marshallian demand function the correspond-
ing expenditure function. For a linear Marshallian demand function, Hausman (1981) showed
that the expenditure function can be derived by using Roy’s identity and the deﬁnition of the
indirect utility function. Introduce a linear Marshallian demand function x(p,y) = αp +βy + γz′
with coefﬁcients α and β, row vector of coefﬁcients γ, and the vector of other variables affecting
demand z. Moreover, introduce the indirect utility function
V (p,y) = max{u(x)|p · x ≤ y} (2)





Forthelineardemandfunction, (3)givesadifferentialequation forwhich Hausman(1981)proved
that the indirect utility function V (p,y) has the following form.












It can easily be shown that this function satisﬁes the integrability conditions as it is continuous,
quasi-convex in p, homogeneous of degree zero in p and y and non increasing in p. Homogeneity
of degree zero in p and y follows directly from the assumption that both p and y are deﬂated by
the price of the other good which is by assumption equal to 1. This proves that the linear demand
function follows from a rational preference relation (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).3 By substituting in
2In case a price p0 is compared with prices p1 and p2, the difference in equivalent variation between both
prices is EV (p0,p1,y0) − EV (p0,p2,y0) = e(p0,u1) − e(p0,u2) and the difference in compensating variation is
CV (p0,p1,y0) − CV (p0,p2,y0) = e(p2,u0) − e(p1,u0). Chipman and Moore (1980) proved that if income does not
change if prices change and if preferences are homothetic, CV (p0,p1,y0) > CV (p0,p2,y0) if p1 < p2 and CV will rank
the different policies correctly. If this assumption does not apply, however, CV not necessarily ranks p1 and p2 correctly
but EV will (see also Mas-Colell et al., 1995, pp. 86). As will be discussed below, in the case analyzed in this paper income
does change if the block price changes due to a change in implicit subsidy received by the consumers if prices change and
therefore EV should be used to rank alternative policies.
3In this paper, a linear demand function is adopted. We make the assumption of implicit separability which justiﬁes a
demand curve with only one price (Arbués et al., 2004) and due to which the quasi indirect utility function (based only
on the single good demand curve) can easily be derived and gives the same measure of equivalent variation as the actual,
many good, indirect utility function (Hausman, 1981). Regularly, linear demand functions are criticized as they would
only apply for restrictive assumptions on the preference ordering. Given the assumptions made above, however, it is
shown that in our situation this does not pose any problems (see e.g. Hausman, 1981; LaFrance, 1985; Arbués et al., 2004;
Beattie and LaFrance, 2006). Linear demand functions are also criticized as they imply a choke price for which demand
is zero (Al-Qunaibet and Johnston, 1985), which is inconsistent with water being a necessary good. On the other hand,
linear demand also implies a satiation level at low prices, which is intuitively correct (Arbués et al., 2004). In much of
the empirical literature, functional forms are chosen that best ﬁt the available data, without considering the underlying
preference structures or related utility function. In the empirical analysis on water demand, the linear demand function is
regularly applied and for a study in Spain, Arbués and Villanúa (2006) show that the linear demand function is the most
appropriate functional form. Moreover, it can be argued that the demand function does not have to be linear over the full
range of prices, as long as it is (approximately) linear over the range of prices considered. It is left for future research to
ﬁnd out how deriving Compensating Variation in case of a kinded budget curve would change if other functional forms
4(4) income y by expenditures e(p,u) and V (p,y) by u, the corresponding expenditure function
follows










As a consequence, using (4) and (5), EV in (1) can easily be calculated if the Marshallian demand
function is known.
Let us now turn to the question how to determine equivalent variation in case of a kinked
budget curve. Consider for the moment for commodity 1 a two-tiered block price system with
block prices pb =
 
p1,p2 
,with pi the price in block i and in which price jumps from p1 to p2
if demand exceeds ¯ x (see Figure 2). Assume for the moment a convex budget set with p1 ≤ p2.
Note that still the price of the second commodity is equal to 1, so that the price vector for the two




. For this situation, equivalent variation for a price change from pb
0 to
pb
















the expenditures in case of a block price system. These expenditures reﬂect the





. Call xe the demand level





and the kinked budget









(for an exact derivation of u1, see the




depends on the segment of the budget line on which xe is
located. Three different cases can be distinguished: xe is at the ﬁrst segment of the budget curve,
at the second segment, or at the kink. Hausman (1985) proved that in case of a convex budget
set and a quasi-concave utility function, there is a unique level of xe, so that only one of the three
cases will apply. First, consider the situation if xe is at the ﬁrst segment of the budget curve. In
that case, the situation is like in Panel (a) of Figure 1 and the expenditures are like in (5) with p
substituted by p1


















≤ ¯ x (7)





















Secondly, if xe is at the second segment, as in Panel (a) in Figure 2, the expenditure function












¯ x less is needed to purchase the quantity xe. The expenditures e(p2
0,u1),
as determined by (5), are also called virtual expenditures. They are the expenditures necessary
to purchase xe if the price were p2






























¯ x is an implicit subsidy for consumers in block 2. It is the difference between
expenditures if p2
0 were the price and the actual expenditures in the block price system. It follows








































































































Figure 2: Schematic representation of EV in case of a kinked budget curve. Expenditures in case
of a kinked budget curve if xe and x1 are at segment 2 of the budget curve (Panel a), xe and x1 are
at the kink (Panel b), xe is at the kink and x1 at segment 1 of the budget curve (Panel c), and xe is
at the kink and x1 at segment 2 of the budget curve (Panel d).


























. Note that a change from a ﬂat to a block pricing system or from a block to a
ﬂat price system is a special case of the method discussed above in which for the ﬂat price system
p1 = p2.
Thirdly, if xe is at the kink, xe = ¯ x, the situation is more complex (see Panel (b)-(d)in Figure 2).









for the budget line with slope p1








< ¯ x for the budget curve with
slope p2
0. The question is how to derive the price ¯ p and virtual income ¯ y = e(¯ p,u1) for which
preferred demand would be ¯ x. How ¯ p and e(¯ p,u1) look like depends on whether the demand
level after the price change, x1, is at the kink or in one of the segments of the budget curve. If
demand x1 and xe are at the kink, the method is simple (see Panel (b) of Figure 2). In that case,
for demand for commodity 2, the numeraire, it has to hold that ¯ x′ = y0 − p1






























If demand level x1 is in block i and demand level xe is at the kink (see Panel (c) and (d) in
Figure 2), the method is more complex. In that case, the virtual equivalent income ¯ y = e(¯ p,u1)
and price ¯ p for which demand would be ¯ x can be determined by using the demand functions
¯ x = α¯ p + β¯ y + γz′ and x1 = αpi
1 + β˜ yi







V (¯ p, ¯ y), with ˜ y1
























is at segment 2. Using the indirect utility function (4) it follows that
for the linear demand function









e(¯ p,u1) = ¯ y = 1
β (¯ x − α¯ p − γz′) = ˜ yi
0 + 1












= e(¯ p,u1) −
 






































(¯ x − x1) (11)
Note that (9) and (11) are the same if x1 = ¯ x.
In case of an n-tiered block price system, the methods discussed above slightly differ. Assume
a situation with n block prices, pb = (p1,...,pn) with block frontiers equal to ¯ x =
 
¯ x0,..., ¯ xn 
, so
that for ¯ xi−1 < x < ¯ xi the price is equal to pi. Note that ¯ x0 = 0 and ¯ xn = ∞. If demand is in block
1 , the usual deﬁnition of expenditures is used. If demand is in block i > 1, equivalent variation
for a change from pb
0 to pb




























 − y0 (12)









is equal to x = (α+β¯ x)p2 +β(y −p1¯ x)+γz′. As a result, the price elasticity of demand changes. As usually α < 0 and
β > 0, it is in theory possible that α+β¯ x > 0, meaning that, perversely, demand increases if the marginal price increases.
In this case, the income effect of a move between two consumption blocks is larger than the price effect. In practice this is
usually not a problem.


















































































The last term at the right-hand side of (12) and the last two terms at the right hand side of the ﬁrst
line of (13) are equal to the implicit subsidy the consumer receives. It is equal to the difference
between what the consumer would pay if the only price wereprice pi
0 or ¯ p and the expendituresin
the block price system. In the water demand and electricity literature, this term is usually deﬁned
as the difference variable and is ﬁrst introduced by Nordin (1976).
The ﬁnal element to be discussed deals with how to determine the segment at which optimal
utility is obtained in case of a non-convex budget set. This method is taken from Hausman (1985).
In case of a convex budget curve the method is as discussed above. For each segment i of the
budget curve, it is determined what will be demand if the marginal price were block price pi. De-
mand lies on segment i if ¯ xi−1 < x(pi, ˜ yi) ≤ ¯ xi. In case of a convex budget set and a quasi concave
utility function, this procedure results in the unique utility optimizing demand level (Hausman,
1985). In the non-convex case, however, which applies for example in case of a (partly) regressive
block price system, a unique optimum no longer necessarily exists as the indifference curves can
be tangent to multiple segments of the budget curve. Information about the utility or indirect
utility function has to be known to ﬁnd the utility maximizing demand level. If this information
is known, the non-convex budget set can be subdivided into a ﬁnite number of convex subsets,
numbered j = 1,...,J. So, the set of segments I = {1,...,n} can be subdivided into J subsets
Ij = {ij−1 + 1,...,ij}, with i0 = 0 and iJ = n. For each convex subset j and iǫIj, the optimal de-
mandlevel xj(pi, ˜ yi), and corresponding pricepi andindirect utility level Vj(pi, ˜ yi) canbe derived




pj+1 − pj 
¯ xj. The
overall optimal demand level can be determined by choosing the price pi and demand x(pi, ˜ yi)
corresponding to the segment yielding the highest indirect utility: V ∗ = max(V1,...,VJ). For the
linear demand function, Vj(pi, ˜ yi) is equal to (4).
For a given individual demand function, the measure of equivalent variation as discussed
above gives the per capita welfare effects of price changes. For determining the overall impact, it
is possible to follow a utilitarian social welfare approach and just aggregate the individual effects.
However, in that case effects on the poor have the same weights as effects on the rich. An often
applied measure that addresses the aggregation problem and takes into consideration inequality
aversion is the Atkinson measure of social welfare. For given income levels yk, k = 1,...,K, for











with ρ > 0 an indicator controlling for the degree of inequality aversion in which ρ = 0 yields
a utilitarian social welfare function and ρ = ∞ yields a Rawlsian maximin welfare function
8(Slesnick, 1998). Usually for ρ a value between 0 and 2 is chosen.5 Which value of ρ should
be adopted is a political question, which is not further discussed here. In this paper, it will only
be assessed to what extent a different value of ρ affects the price system that results in the highest
level of social welfare.
To apply this measure for analyzing the social welfare effects of price changes, an income
measure should be adopted that properly measures the income change that is equivalent to the
welfare effect of a price change. For this, the measure of equivalent income is an appropriate
measure.6 Equivalent income is the income that an individualwould needbeforethe pricechange
(at price pb










(7), (8) and (10). This gives the necessary ingredients to derive social welfare for a given value of
inequality aversion ρ.
3 Water demand in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo
The Brazilian Metropolitan Region of São Paulo (MRSP) is one of the most densely populated
areas in the world, housing more than 15 million people. The MRSP houses 50% of the state’s
population whereas it only occupies 2.7% of its territory. The MRSP regularly suffers from water
shortage. As a result, SABESP, the main energy, water resources and sanitation secretary of the
MRSP, has to ration water distribution. SABESP applies a ﬁve-tiered, non-convex block price
system in which between 1997 and 2002 the prices from block 2 to 5 were on average p2 = 0.41,
p3 = 1.43, p4 = 2.04 and p5 = 2.26 Real/m3 for consumption quantities ranging from 10-20,
20-30, 30-50 and higher than 50 m3 per month per connection, respectively. In that period, the
price of the ﬁrst 10 m3 was on average p1 = 2.56 Real/m3, which included the ﬁxed costs. This
system assures a safe minimum level of revenues for the water company, but may for the poorer
population result in high average prices and relatively high expenses. Note that due to this price
system, the budget constraint is non-convex. A connection contained on average 6.01 people.
Comparable systems are applied in other Latin American cities (Walker et al., 2000).
In the past, much has been written on estimating water demand functions in a block price sys-
tem (see e.g. Arbués et al. (2003) and Arbués and Villanúa (2006) for an overview). Even though
using micro-level data is preferred for estimating water demand functions, only few papers actu-
ally use it due to the difﬁculty of obtaining these data (see e.g. Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989);
Hewitt and Hanemann (1995); Arbués et al. (2004); Arbués and Villanúa (2006)). With micro-
data, the discrete/continuous choice model as proposed by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) could
be applied, which speciﬁcally models the choice of consumption block, or a dynamic panel data
method like in Arbués et al. (2004) and Arbués and Villanúa (2006). Similar to most papers focus-
ing on water demand estimation, for the MRSP only aggregatedata were available and, therefore,
the estimates are based on these aggregate data. Besides a number of econometric estimation is-
sues, demand functions can depend on average or on marginal prices, depending on how well
consumers are informed about the block price system applied. According to Taylor (1975), price
jumps caused by the movement to another block have an income effect due to which a demand
function depending only on the marginal price is theoretically incorrect. For that reason, Nordin
5Notethatforρ > 1social welfarelevelsW becomenegativewhich can bepreventedbyasimplelineartransformation.





), is not an appropri-
ate mesaure as it gives the income necessary to stay at the same utility level as before a price change from pb
0 to pb
1. The
problem is that compensating income yc reduces if the price reduces whereas welfare increases in that case.
9(1976) introduced a difference variable, accounting for the difference between the costs of water
consumption if the marginal price were the only price and the true costs under the block price
system. Its effect is hypothesized to be of the same magnitude as the income effect. It is, however,
theoretically plausible and it has been empirically supported by different empirical studies (see
e.g. Billings and Agthe, 1980; Chicoine and Ramamurthy, 1986) that the effect of a consumption
related subsidy may be different from the income effect. This may be because consumers are
not well informed or because the difference variable is small relative to income. A much cited
comment on the use of marginal prices is that many people are not well informed and that there-
fore a demand model based on average prices is more realistic. To test for whether the marginal
or average price model is superior, Opaluch (1982, 1984) proposed a model with a decomposed
measure of average and marginal price. It is an empirical question which demand model is most
appropriate.
For estimating a water demand function for the MRSP, aggregate data were used on monthly
water consumption, number of connections, block prices and water rationing for the period July
1997 - December 2002 obtained from SABESP for the consumers from 39 municipalities covering
almost the entire MRSP (data were available for a period of 64 months). Prices were deﬂated
using the Brazilian price index IPCA/IBGE, which is available on a monthly basis. In the data
set, average consumption per household (total residential consumption divided by the number
of connections) was always in the third consumption block. Although individual households
may be in different consumption blocks, depending on income and other household variables,
because we only obtained aggregate consumption data, we interpret p3 as the marginal price
of household water consumption. Moreover, income data for the period 1996-2003 was obtained
from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (PNAD/IBGE) which were deﬂatedusing
the Brazilianprice index IPCA/IBGE, population data from the State Data Analysis System Foun-
dation (SEADE) and monthly data on rainfall and temperature from the Institute of Atmosphere
and Geography (IAG). For a more elaborate discussion of the data, see Ruijs et al. (2005).
Using these data, Ruijs et al. (2005) estimated the following marginal price, water demand
function: xt = αpt + βyt + δdt + γzt
′ + ǫt, with pt, yt and dt price in block 3 (p3), income and
difference variable and zt a vector with rainfall, temperature, rationing, lagged consumption,
lagged rainfall and the intercept and ǫt the error term. Using the approach of Opaluch (1982), it
was estimated whether the marginal or average price model should be used, but based on the
results neither of the methods could be rejected. Moreover, in this model, the coefﬁcient δ of
the difference variable was notably different from the income coefﬁcient β, as observed in many
other empirically estimated demand functions. In the current paper, a new function is estimated
in which it is assumed that the income effect is equal to the effect of changes in the difference
variable. Allowing for differences in these coefﬁcients is theoretically debatable and would make
themethoddiscussedinSection 2incorrect. Afterall, inthatcaseitwould haveto beassumedthat
virtualincome is not equal to income plus the differencevariable,butsmaller orlarger,depending
on the relation between β and δ. For that reason, the function estimated is
xt = αpt + β(yt + di
t) + γz′




j=1(pj+1 − pj)¯ xj, see (12), if demand is in block i. Lagged consumption was
included to correct for autocorrelation. The model was solved using OLS. As in the aggregate
data all observations reﬂected consumption in the third consumption block, simultaneity which
10Table 1: Regression estimates of per capita water demand (m3/month/person)
Descriptives Water demand
Mean Stand.Dev. Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Intercept 2.2805 2.8114∗∗
Price1 1.43 0.05 -0.5858 -1.7577∗
Virtual Income2 744.23 25.74 0.0011 2.2590∗∗
Time3 -0.0040 -3.3694∗∗
Temperature4 19.55 2.57 0.0477 7.2488∗∗
Rainfall5 118.30 90.94 -0.0004 -2.5994∗∗
Rationing6 0.26 0.44 -0.0895 -3.1419∗∗
Lagged consumption7 0.2928 3.3648∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.820 Durbin Watson test 1.666
F-statistic 42.015 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 0.815
Sample size 63
Notes: * signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, 1) Real/m3, 2) Real/month/person,
3) month, 4) oC, 5) mm/month,6) no=0, yes=1, 7) m3/month/person
is causedby the endogenous relation betweenprice andconsumption in ablock price system, was
not a problem and it was not necessary to use instrumental variable techniques (see e.g. Arbués
and Villanúa, 2006). In the estimation, observations with studentized residuals exceeding ±2.8
were removed, leaving 63 of the 64 observations. Finally, normality of residuals was tested using
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Results are presented in Table 1.
The coefﬁcient signs are as expected. Higher prices, more rainfall and more rationing lead
to a reduced demand, whereas higher income and higher temperatures result in an increase of
demand. Higher temperatures or less precipitation will induce people to take more showers, do
the laundry more often, water the garden more often and use the swimming pool more often.
The price and income elasticities of demand, computed at the mean price and income values, are
equal to -0.20 and 0.19, respectively. Water demand is inelastic and elasticities are rather low but
within the ranges mentioned in many other studies reporting price elasticities of demand ranging
between -0.05 and -0.75 and income elasticities ranging between 0.05 and 0.50 with a few studies
reporting elasticities exceeding 1 or even 2 (Dalhuisen and Nijkamp, 2001; Arbués et al., 2003).
4 Scenario analysis
To illustrate the method discussed above, the distribution and welfare effects of changes in block
pricing systems in the MRSP on different income groups will be analyzed, using the demand
function estimated above. Demand changes, average prices, water bills, equivalent variation and
social welfare will be determined for a number of price systems for ﬁve income groups in order to
explore the effects of price changes. Extrapolating the demand function to other income groups
may result in biased estimates of real demand and welfare effects, especially for the poorest and
richest income groups, which could be prevented if the availability of micro data would allow for
more detailed analysis. The analysis, however, will still give a good illustration of the method
discussed above, which is the main objective of this paper, and give an indication of the income
distribution effects of alternative price policies.
Using dataon income distribution for the MRSP for the year 2000(Minnesota Population Cen-
ter, 2006), average income is determined for ﬁve income quintiles, which is used to calculate their
demand and average price (see Table 2). The average expenses on water as percentage of income
11Table 2: Yearly per capita income, per capita demand, water bill and average price per income
quintile.
Income Per capita Per capita Water bill Average Water bill as
quintile1 income demand (Real/year) price % of income
(Real/year) (m3/year)2 (Real/m3)3
1 1,257 42 63 1.48 4.98%
2 2,601 44 65 1.48 2.49%
3 4,361 46 68 1.48 1.55%
4 7,751 49 73 1.47 0.94%
5 28,753 68 105 1.54 0.37%
Average 8,945 50 75 1.49 0.83%
Notes: 1) Quintile 1 corresponds to the20% of the population having the lowest income, quintile 5 corresponds to the 20%
of the population having the highest income. Income shares are 2.81%, 5.82%, 9.75%, 17.33% and 64.29% for income quin-
tile 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Income shares are for 2000, source: Minnesota Population Center (2006). 2) Consumers of
quintile 1, 2, 3 and 4 have a monthly consumption per connection in block 3. Consumers of quintile 5 have a consumption
in block 5. 3) Average price = water bill/demand.
are in line with data from the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE, 2003), which
report for the MRSP water expenses as part of total expenses to be on average 0.77%. The differ-
ences between the poor and richer parts of the population, however, are considerable. Where the
poorest 20% of the consumers spend on average almost 5% of their income on a consumption of
42 m3 per year, the richest part of the population spends only about 0.4% of their income on a
consumption of 68 m3 per person per year. The richest consumers have a consumption in block 4,
whereas the others have their consumption in block 3. The poorest population has a consumption
in block 2 in some months. Average prices do not show a stepwise increase for the ﬁrst four quin-
tiles. So, although it is often claimed that a block price system is good for the poor, this can not
be concluded for the current system in the MRSP which has a progressive price system only from
the second till the ﬁfth block and a very high price in the ﬁrst block. Although averageprices may
show a slight progression, the water bill as a % of income for the poorest consumers is more than
14 times higher than for the richest consumers and still 5 times higher than for the consumers in
the fourth income quintile.
In a scenario analysis, it is investigated for two types of scenarios what will be the distribu-
tional effects of introducing alternative pricing mechanisms (see Table 3 and 4). In the ﬁrst sce-
nario, a number of block price or block size changes are compared for which the welfare effects
for the median consumer are negligible (i.e. for which EV = 0 for the consumers in block 3). In
the second scenario, a number of block price changes are compared which are budget neutral for
the water company, as results from the ﬁrst scenario show that their revenues may change sub-
stantially. Remember that a partial equilibrium approach is adopted in which the indirect welfare
effects of water suppliers’ deﬁcits or of changes in expenditures are not considered. An alterna-
tive and potentially interesting scenario would be the application of optimal nonlinear pricing
(see e.g. Feldstein (1972); Renzetti (1992); Anderson (2004)). As cost data necessary for this are
not available, this aspect is kept for future research.7 The following scenarios are analyzed.
1. Block changes resulting in a zero welfare effect for the median consumer.
7It is recognized that many alternative scenarios of price change could be chosen. The scenarios chosen have as objec-
tive to explore whether the MRSP could adopt a price system that is more pro-poor without affecting to a too high extent
total demand or total revenues for the water company.
12(a) Decrease p1 with 15%, increase p2 and p3 with 63.2% and do not change p4 and p5.
(b) Introduce a progressive block price system with p1 = 1, p2 = 1.84, p3 = 2.60, p4 = 3
and p5 = 4 Real/m3.
(c) Introduce a ﬂat price system with p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = p5= 1.478 Real/m3.
(d) Decrease p1 with 15% only for the consumers of income quintile 1, 2 and 3, increase p2
and p3 with 63.2% for all consumers and do not change p4 and p5.
(e) Keep the prices at their base level but change the block structure into ¯ x1=5.25, ¯ x2=10,
¯ x3=25 and ¯ x4=50 m3 per connection per month.
2. Block changes which are budget neutral for the water company.
(a) Decrease p1 with 15%, increase p2 and p3 with 97.3% and do not change p4and p5.
(b) Introduce a progressive block price system with p1 = 1, p2 = 2.27, p3 = 2.60, p4 = 3
and p5 = 4 Real/m3.
(c) Introduce a ﬂat price system with p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = p5= 1.480 Real/m3.
(d) Decrease p1 with 15% only for the consumers of income quintile 1, 2 and 3, increase p2
and p3 with 66.8% for all consumers and do not change p4 and p5.
The results of the scenario analysis shows some interesting patterns even though welfare ef-
fects are, as expected, small. The reader is reminded that a positive value for the equivalent
variation represents a welfare increase whereas a negative value represents a welfare decrease.
For all sub-scenarios of scenario 1, the effect of the policy change results in a zero welfare effect
for the consumers in Quintile 3. The changes in demand, average price, water bill and com-
pensating variation differ substantially between the different income groups. For example, if in
Scenario 1a the price of the ﬁrst block is reduced by 15% and the second and third block price in-
creaseby 63%, demand and water bills decreasesubstantially, especially for the poor. On average,
welfare slightly decreases (-3.10 Real), but for the poor household welfare increases (+1.95 Real)
whereas for the richest 40% of the population welfare decreases (-3.22 and -15.52 Real, respec-
tively). A drawback is the reduction in revenues earned by the water company, which decreases
by 4.5%. This reduction may, especially, cause problems in the quality of the water services pro-
vided. Moreover, in the results, equivalent variation increases, whereas demand decreases,which
seems to be counter intuitive. The main reason for the increase of EV is a reduction of the average
price due to which a higher equivalent income is needed to reach with the ex-ante price system
the ex-post utility level. The reason why demand decreases, even though the average price falls,
is that for this scenario the marginal price for the consumers increases(p2 and p3 increase)but that
dueto the reductionof p1 the differencevariableincreases. The demandeffectof an increaseof the
marginal price is much stronger than the income effect of an increase of the difference variable.
Next, if in Scenario 1b the price system is changed into a progressive block price system, the
average welfare reduction is larger, especially so because of a larger negative welfare effect for
the richest households. Moreover, welfare effects for the poorest are higher than in the other
sub-scenarios. It is especially the larger reduction of the ﬁrst block price which has a large effect
on welfare for the poor as these ﬁxed costs are such a large part of their water bill, especially
compared to the situation for the richer groups. For this scenario, demand decreases as, like in
Scenario1a, the prices of the second till the ﬁfth block increase. A positive effectis the largereduc-
tion of the water bill for the poorer consumers which is partly caused by a substantial reduction
13Table 3: Effectsof changing block price structures on demand, averageprice, waterbill and equiv-
alent variation for different income groups and effects on revenues collected by the water com-
pany for Scenario 1. Entries in bold are the percentage change of the revenues collected by the
water company. Percentage changes are compared with the base results as presented in Table 2.
Income %change in Average water %change in Equivalent
quintile water demand price (Real/m3) water bill Variation (Real)
Scen.1a: p1 -15%, p2 and p3 + 63.2% and p4 and p5 +0%
1 -5.6% 1.42 -9.4% 1.95
2 -8.8% 1.42 -12.4% 1.29
3 -11.6% 1.43 -14.3% 0.00
4 -12.8% 1.49 -11.9% -3.22
5 -0.03% 1.77 14.8% -15.52
Average -7.2% 1.54 -4.5% -3.10
Scen.1b: p1 = 1, p2 = 1.84, p3 = 2.6, p4 = 3 and p5 = 4 Real/m3
1 -7.9% 1.41 -12.4% 2.13
2 -9.3% 1.42 -13.1% 1.35
3 -12.6% 1.42 -16.0% 0.00
4 -16.3% 1.46 -17.0% -3.79
5 -9.7% 1.85 8.4% -25.58
Average -11.2% 1.55 -8.2% -5.18
Scen.1c: p1 = p2 =p3 = p4 = p5 = 1.4784 Real/m3
1 -0.8% 1.48 -1.0% 0.16
2 -0.7% 1.48 -0.9% 0.09
3 -0.7% 1.48 -0.7% 0.00
4 -0.7% 1.48 -0.4% -0.18
5 5.8% 1.48 1.7% 5.17
Average 1.1% 1.48 0.06% 1.05
Scen.1d: p1 -15% for quintile 1, 2 and 3; p2 and p3 +63.2% and p4 and p5 +0% for all
1 -5.6% 1.42 -9.4% 1.95
2 -8.8% 1.42 -12.4% 1.29
3 -11.6% 1.43 -14.3% 0.00
4 -12.8% 1.67 -1.4% -10.88
5 -0.04% 1.88 22.0% -23.19
Average -7.2% 1.60 -0.4% -6.16
Scen.1e: Block structure ¯ x1 = 5.25, ¯ x2 = 10, ¯ x3 = 25, ¯ x4 = 50
1 0.0% 1.48 0.0% 0.00
2 0.0% 1.48 0.0% 0.00
3 0.0% 1.48 0.0% 0.00
4 -1.0% 1.48 -1.0% 0.14
5 -0.0% 1.63 5.8% -6.10
Average -0.2% 1.52 1.4% -1.19
14in demand. A negative effect is, however, a large reduction of the revenues collected by the water
company. For this scenario, average prices increase stepwise with income.
In contrast, the ﬂat price system presented in Scenario 1c does result on average in a welfare
increase, but especially so for the richer households. Effects on welfare, demand and water bills
forthe poor arenegligible. Welfareanddemandeffectsaresmall as the averagepriceonly reduces
marginally compared to the base situation. A positive effect is the negligible effect on revenues
collected by the water company.
In Scenario 1d, in which the price of the ﬁrst block only decreases for the consumers from
quintile 1, 2 and 3, on average welfare decreases. The welfare increases for consumers from
the poorest three quintiles are, of course, similar to those of Scenario 1a, but effects are worse
for consumers from Quintile 4 and 5. For this scenario, average prices for the different income
groups show a stepwise increase and especially the poorest beneﬁt at the expense of welfare for
the richest consumers. The richest consumers, in fact, compensate the water company for the
subsidies given to the poor. This scenario is almost budget neutral for the water company. Such
an income dependent price system is more favorable for the poor than for the rich, but one can
wonder whether such a system is politically feasible and whether the administrative costs are not
exceeding the equity gains. Note that an income dependent reduction of the ﬁxed costs, closely
corresponds to an income transfer to the poorer consumers.
Finally, a change in the block structure as proposed in Scenario 1e, does not result in any
signiﬁcant changes for the poor. In order to keep the median consumer at the same utility level,
the change in block sizes should be such that a reduction in expenses due to the decrease of ¯ x1, is
compensated by an increase of expenses due to an increase of the size of block 3 (i.e. by reducing
¯ x2), in which consumption is located. As consumers of Quintile 1 to 3 are all in consumption
block 3, they are all affectedin the same way. As a result also revenues by the water company will
be unaffected. For consumers in Quintile 4 and 5, the welfare effect additionally depends on the
change of the frontier of block 3 (¯ x4). If ¯ x4 decreases by a large enough quantity, demand for both
groups will be in block 4 and EV will decline as a larger part of consumption will be consumed at
a higher price. If the block frontier increases, the reverse will happen.
Summarizing, these results show that speciﬁcally considering the welfare effects for different
income groups gives more insight in the effects of price changes than just considering the average
welfare effects. The average effect of a price change may be positive, and therefore appealing to
decision makers, but its individual effects for particular groups may be the opposite. Moreover, a
system that treats consumers more equally (e.g. a ﬂat price system) will result in general in higher
average welfare whereas the more pro-poor systems are detrimental for average welfare. The
results, however, show that the reverse is true for welfare effects for the poor. It should be noted,
however, that the welfare effects of the price changes proposed here are relatively small. The ﬂat
price system, which will result in the highest average welfare change, only has a marginal effect
on welfareforthe majority ofthe consumers comparedtothe benchmark, exceptforthe rich. Note
that a change from a progressive to a ﬂat price system will have larger effects (the change from
Scenario 1b to 1c will result in an average welfare increase of 6.23 Real, but a reduction of welfare
for the ﬁrst two quintiles of 1.97 and 1.26 Real, respectively; welfare of the richest group will
increase with 30.75 Real). Moreover, a drawback of the pro-poor price systems, is that revenues
collected by the water company may decrease, which might endanger the ﬁnancial viability of
the water services provision and therefore have important indirect welfare effects. This might be
prevented by introducing an income dependent system, but at the expense of the rich.
15Table 4: Effectsof changing block price structures on demand, averageprice, waterbill and equiv-
alent variation for different income groups and effects on revenues collected by the water com-
pany for Scenario 2. Entries in bold are the percentage change of the revenues collected by the
water company. Percentage changes are compared with the base results as presented in Table 2.
Income %change in Average water %change in Equivalent
quintile water demand price (Real/m3) water bill Variation (Real)
Scen.2a: p1 -15%, p2 and p3 +97.3% and p4 and p5 +0%
1 -5.6% 1.49 -5.0% -0.83
2 -8.8% 1.49 -8.1% -1.48
3 -12.7% 1.49 -11.9% -2.82
4 -18.0% 1.51 -15.9 % -6.83
5 -0.05% 1.95 26.7% -28.04
Average -8.4% 1.63 0.0% -8.00
Scen.2b: p1 = 1, p2 = 2.27, p3 = 2.6, p4 = 3 and p5 = 4 Real/m3
1 -13.8% 1.57 -8.5% -5.48
2 -13.4% 1.60 -6.3% -6.71
3 -14.2% 1.62 -5.9% -8.41
4 -16.3% 1.67 -5.3% -12.28
5 -9.8% 1.99 16.5% -34.07
Average -13.2% 1.72 0.0% -13.39
Scen.2c: p1 = p2 =p3 = p4 = p5 = 1.4795 Real/m3
1 -0.8% 1.48 -1.0% 0.11
2 -0.8% 1.48 -0.8% 0.04
3 -0.7% 1.48 -0.6% -0.05
4 -0.7% 1.48 -0.4% -0.23
5 5.7% 1.48 1.7% 5.09
Average 1.0% 1.48 0.0% 0.99
Scen.2d: p1 -15% for quintile 1, 2 and 3; p2 and p3 +66.8% and p4 and p5 +10% for all
1 -5.6% 1.43 -9.0% 1.65
2 -8.8% 1.43 -11.9% 0.99
3 -11.9% 1.44 -14.4% -0.32
4 -13.5% 1.67 -2.0% -11.33
5 -0.04% 1.90 23.3% -24.53
Average -7.4% 1.61 0.0% -6.71
16Next, Scenario 2 compares four different block price systems for which the effects on the rev-
enues for the water company are negligible. Changing the block sizes without affecting the rev-
enues is also possible, but will not be further considered here. Scenario 2a shows that a reduction
of the ﬁrst block price by 15% and an increase of the second and third block price by 97.3%, will
result in a welfare reduction (-8.00 Real) which is negative for all consumers and which is largest
for the richer consumers (-28.04 Real). Their water bill increases, whereas the bill for the poorer
consumers decreases. Due to the larger increase of p2 and p3, average prices do increase for all
consumption quintiles, due to which demand decreases more than the water bill. An interesting
observation is that a revenue neutral price system does not exist if prices p2 to p5 all increase with
the same percentage; increasing as well p4 will result in a decrease of revenues for the water com-
pany due to a lower demand of consumption quintile 5. Note that compared to Scenario 1a, the
prices p2 and p3 have to increase substantially more.
Scenario 2b shows that welfare effects are worse for (almost) all consumers if a progressive
price system is introduced. Compared to Scenario 1b, in order to reach budget neutrality, p2 has
to be considerably higher (2.27 Real instead of 1.84 Real) which has a considerable effect on water
demand and individual welfare for all consumers. It is an interesting observation that combining
the objective of having a pro-poor price system with the objective of revenue neutrality for the
water company is difﬁcult even though the progressive price system is said to be pro-poor. In
order to reach revenue neutrality p2 and p3 have to increase to such an extent that the positive
welfare effects of decreasing p1 are nulliﬁed.
The results of Scenario 2c are comparable to those of Scenario 1c, but are presented because of
the importance of the ﬂat price system. Note that only for the ﬂat and for the income dependent
price system (Scenario 2c and 2d), a budget neutral price change results in a positive welfare
effect for the poor. A ﬂat price system is moderately positive for the rich (+5.10 Real), negligible
for the poor (+0.11 Real) and on average moderately positive for welfare (+1.00 Real). The income
dependent price system has a negative average welfare effect (-6.71 Real) and a negative effect on
welfare for the rich (-24.53 Real). The poor beneﬁt (+1.65 Real) as their ﬁxed fees (price p1) are
reduced.
In summary, these results show that there is a trade off between a more equitable price system
that is welfare increasing for the poor and revenues collected by the water company. Reaching
both objectives with changes in the price system is not feasible and alternative policies will be
needed which can either be subsidizing the water company or ﬁnancially supporting the poorer
households via other price or income measures. Note that the results only give the partial equi-
librium effects of price changes. A decrease in ﬁnancial viability of the water company will nega-
tivelyaffectawelfareincreaseofindividual consumers andasubsidy to either the watercompany
or the poorer consumers has to be ﬁnanced in one way or the other. Finally, changing the current
price system into a ﬂat price system which leaves the revenues of the water company unaffected
would for most consumers result in only a small effect on average prices, demand, water bill and
welfare. The average welfare change is small for most households and moderately positive for
the rich. So, like in Scenario 1, albeit the ﬂat price system is welfare improving it is at the expense
of the poor.
Finally, social welfare levels for the different scenarios are discussed. The Atkinson social
welfaremeasureas discussed in (14)gives an aggregatewelfaremeasurewhich takes into account
inequality aversion. The higher inequality aversion, the more emphasis will be put on the welfare
effects for the lower income groups. The results in Table 5 show, as can be expected, that the
17Table 5: Percentagechanges in social welfarefor the differentprice scenarios for differentlevels of
inequality aversion. Percentage changes are compared to the base level of social welfare. Figures
in bold give the subscenarios yielding the highest level of social welfare.
Scenario ρ = 0 ρ = 0.5 ρ = 1 ρ = 1.5 ρ = 2
Base Scen. 8945 164 8.52 -0.032 -0.00031
Scen.1a -0.035% -0.006% 0.0026% 0.028% 0.086%
Scen.1b -0.058% -0.013% 0.0019% 0.029% 0.092%
Scen.1c 0.012% 0.004% 0.0008% 0.003% 0.008%
Scen.1d -0.069% -0.022% -0.0004% 0.020% 0.077%
Scen.1e -0.013% -0.004% -0.0005% -0.0006% -0.0003%
Scen.2a -0.089% -0.041% -0.0088% -0.034% -0.066%
Scen.2b -0.150% -0.092% -0.0273% -0.142% -0.328%
Scen.2c 0.011% 0.004% 0.0006% 0.002% 0.005%
Scen.2d -0.075% -0.026% -0.0016% 0.014% 0.061%
difference in social welfare between the different scenarios are small. Water expenses are on
average about 0.83% of total income (see Table 2) and as a consequence, a small change in water
prices only result in a small change in equivalent income. If no account is given to inequality (for
ρ = 0), a ﬂat price (Scenario 1c and 2c) gives the highest level of social welfare. This scenario is
also the only scenario considered that results in a positive average equivalent variation. If more
account is given to inequality, Scenario 1a, 1b and 2d, become slightly better for social welfare.
Even though average equivalent variation is negative and even though equivalent variation for
the higher income groups does decrease,social welfareincreases more than in the other scenarios.
If no account is given to budget neutrality, the negative effects of an income dependent system
(Scenario 1d) on the rich make that a smaller ﬁxed fee (Scenario 1a) or a progressive price system
(Scenario 1b) score better. If budget neutrality is considered, jointly with a reduction of the ﬁxed
fee, an income dependent system can compensate the water company for the reduced revenues
obtained from the poor. Due to the skewed income distribution in the MRSP, already for low
levels of ρ, the more pro-poor price systems give a higher level of social welfare than the ﬂat
price system. The social welfare indicator conﬁrms the results already given above that there is a
trade off between income distribution and welfare. The more account is given to inequality, the
more pro-poor pricing schemes should be. Furthermore, the lower social welfare levels for most
subscenarios of Scenario 2 compared to those in Scenario 1 also conﬁrm the trade off between
revenue neutrality and income distribution. Due to the very small differences in social welfare
between the different scenarios, however, a ﬁnal choice on the optimal price system needs a more
in depth analysis of the transaction costs of the differentsystems and of the indirectwelfareeffects
of cross subsidization through pricing systems.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, the welfare and distribution effects of changes in block price systems are evaluated.
A methodology is discussed with which equivalent variation can be determined in case of a block
price system with a linear demand function. This paper shows that determining the exact welfare
effects of changes in block price systems with equivalent variation is possible on the basis of the
Marshallian demand function and that it is not much more difﬁcult than determining the less
exact measure of consumer surplus.
18The methodology has been applied to evaluate welfare and distribution effects of residential
water demand in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo. Currently, the main water company
in the MRSP applies a ﬁve-tiered block price system in which the prices in the second till the
ﬁfth blocks increase stepwise and in which the price in the ﬁrst consumption block is higher
than the price in the ﬁfth block. Using aggregate, monthly data on consumption, prices, income,
rainfall,temperature,rationing andpopulation for the period July 1997to December2002,alinear
demand function has been estimated. Price and income elasticities are-0.20and 0.19,respectively.
The inelasticity shows that it is difﬁcult to reach a substantial reduction of demand, especially for
the richer consumers, by using only pricing policies. Additional policies will be needed to make
people more aware of the water scarcity problems in urban areas.
Using the demand function, the effects of a number of scenarios of alternative price systems
are evaluated for ﬁve income groups. The results show that although the average water price for
the richer households is higher than for the poorer,water bills for the poor area substantial partof
their income whereas they are very small for the rich. The scenario analysis shows that, as can be
expected,a ﬂat price system is better for the rich and a progressiveblock pricesystem is in general
better for the poor. Moreover, if no account is given to inequality, social welfare is highest in a ﬂat
price system. If inequality aversion increases, pro-poor systems and income dependent systems,
result in higher social welfare. The individual welfare effects, however, are only marginal. As
a result no major income distribution changes can be reached in the MRSP if the water pricing
system would be turned into a more pro-poor system. Furthermore, one can question whether
the transaction costs of the administrative system necessary for an income dependent or pro-poor
price system do not outweigh the welfare gains. An additional analysis of these transaction costs
would be required for answering this question. Finally, there is a trade off between the ﬁnancial
situation of the water company and a more equitable price system that is welfare increasing for
the poor. Compared to the current price system, a progressive block price system that does not
affect the revenues collected by the water company, results in a welfare loss for all.
Although price systems that consider income distribution may not be as good for average
welfare as ﬂat price systems, their direct effects on poverty and social welfare should not be
neglected and are worthwhile to look at. As for the MRSP these effects turned out to be small,
it can be questioned whether it would not be better and cheaper to use other instruments than
water price changes to reach a situation in which consumption by the rich is treated differently
than consumption by the poor.
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A Appendix: Derivation of utility level u1.
The deﬁnition of indirect utility shows that in case of a ﬂat price p and budget y, utility is equal to
u = V (p,y), see (4). In case of a kinked budget curve, the exact deﬁnition depends on the segment
on which demand x1is located, see also Figure 1, 2 and 3, and see also the discussion on eb(pb,u1).
From this it follows that:









































Figure 3: Schematic representation of utility if demand x1 is at the kink of the budget curve.
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. From (2) follows that ∂
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∂¯ p2 > 0 and ∂V
∂¯ p = 0 for
¯ p =
 
¯ x − βy0 − γz + βp1
1¯ x
 
/(β¯ x + α). As y0 − p1
1¯ x = ¯ y − ¯ p¯ x, it follows that ¯ y = y0 +
 
¯ p − p1
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¯ x, which gives all ingredients to derive u1 = V (¯ p, ¯ y).
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